A Better Facet of Dynamic Information Flow Control by Ngo, Minh et al.
A Better Facet of Dynamic Information Flow Control
Downloaded from: https://research.chalmers.se, 2020-07-11 06:39 UTC
Citation for the original published paper (version of record):
Ngo, M., Bielova, N., Flanagan, C. et al (2018)
A Better Facet of Dynamic Information Flow Control
The Web Conference 2018 - Companion of the World Wide Web Conference, WWW 2018: 731-739
http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3184558.3185979
N.B. When citing this work, cite the original published paper.
research.chalmers.se offers the possibility of retrieving research publications produced at Chalmers University of Technology.
It covers all kind of research output: articles, dissertations, conference papers, reports etc. since 2004.
research.chalmers.se is administrated and maintained by Chalmers Library
(article starts on next page)
A Better Facet of Dynamic Information Flow Control
Minh Ngo
INRIA, France
nguyen-nhat-minh.ngo@inria.fr
Nataliia Bielova
INRIA, France
nataliia.bielova@inria.fr
Cormac Flanagan
UCSC, USA
cormac@ucsc.edu
Tamara Rezk
INRIA, France
tamara.rezk@inria.fr
Alejandro Russo
Chalmers University of Technology,
Sweden
russo@chalmers.se
Thomas Schmitz
UCSC, USA
tschmitz@ucsc.edu
ABSTRACT
Multiple Facets (MF) is a dynamic enforcement mechanism which
has proved to be a good fit for implementing information flow se-
curity for JavaScript. It relies on multi executing the program, once
per each security level or view, to achieve soundness. By looking
inside programs, MF encodes the views to reduce the number of
needed multi-executions.
In this work, we extend Multiple Facets in three directions. First,
we propose a new version of MF for arbitrary lattices, called Gener-
alised Multiple Facets, or GMF. GMF strictly generalizes MF, which
was originally proposed for a specific lattice of principals. Second,
we propose a new optimization on top of GMF that further reduces
the number of executions. Third, we strengthen the security guar-
antees provided by Multiple Facets by proposing a termination
sensitive version that eliminates covert channels due to termina-
tion.
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1 INTRODUCTION
JavaScript has become the de facto programming language of the
Web. Web browsers daily execute thousands of JavaScript lines
which usually have access to confidential information, for example
cookies that mark that the user in a web session is authenticated.
It is not surprising that JavaScript is a common target for attacks.
While browsers deploy security measures in the form of access
control (e.g., SOP and CSP), they are insufficient [12, 17, 30] to
protect confidentiality of data.
Information flow control (IFC) is a promising technology which
provides a systematic solution to handle unintentional or malicious
leaks of confidential information. Recently, dynamic IFC analyses
have received a lot of attention [1–3, 5, 7, 9, 10, 14, 26, 33], due, in
part, to its applicability to JavaScript—where static analyses are
rather an awkward fit [29].
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In order to scale, a suitable IFC technique for the web not only
needs to be dynamic but also needs to reduce to the minimum the
modifications required to existing JavaScript code. In this light,
an interesting dynamic IFC technique which fulfills both of these
requirements consists in executing several copies of a program: one
execution per each security level or view. In that manner, each copy
of the program (view) depends only on information observable
to the corresponding security level, where no leaks are therefore
possible. Secure Multi Execution (SME) [14] and Multiple Facets
(MF) [3] are two techniques based on this idea.
Both techniques have been proved to be a good fit for informa-
tion flow security in the web since they have been successfully
implemented as extensions of the Firefox browser [13, 33].
Although both SME and MF are based on multi-executions, they
present important differences [7]. On one hand, SME is black-
box [24], i.e., it is a mechanism that does not look inside programs
but rather change the semantics of inputs and outputs to ensure
security. For a moment, we assume a scenario where security levels
are simply sets of principals (e.g., web origins) which denote those
authorities with confidentiality concerns over data. In such a sce-
nario, SME needs to spawn one execution for any possible set of
principals—where the number of executions grows exponentially
with respect to the number of principals! Instead, MF [3] is designed
to reduce the number of multi-executions and the memory footprint
of SME. It does so by inspecting programs code and multi-executing
instructions and multiplexing memory only when needed. While
MF is more resource-friendly than SME, SME provides stronger se-
curity guarantees when it comes to leaks via abnormal termination
[7].
Our broad goal is to augment the efficiency of techniques based
on MF and SME to general cases. In particular, we discovered that
MF might sometimes spawn more multi-executions than SME—
something that is counter-intuitive when considering the purpose
of MF (see Section 2). Our first contribution consists on a novel
technique to further reduce the number of multi-executions (and
memory footprint) of MF. Our second contribution is to generalize
MF to work for arbitrary finite lattices (see Section 3) rather than
being restricted to the security lattice of principals as in the original
proposal [3]. This becomes useful when, for instance, a program
depends on 5 security levels. In such case, as stated originally, MF
will need to encode them by using (at least) 3 principals (23 > 5),
and thus execute the program 23 = 8 times, while SME will execute
it only 5 times (one per security level). Finally, we combine MF and
SME into a single new dynamic IFC mechanism in order to provide
security guarantees as strong as SME (i.e., termination sensitive
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skip (skip, µ) ⇓ µ assign
v = µ(e)
(x := e, µ) ⇓ µ[x 7→ v]
if
µ(e) = v (Pv , µ) ⇓ µ′
(if e then Ptt else Pff, µ) ⇓ µ′
seq
(P1, µ) ⇓ µ′ (P2, µ′) ⇓ µ′′
(P1; P2, µ) ⇓ µ′′
while
(if e then P ;while e do P else skip, µ) ⇓ µ′
(while e do P, µ) ⇓ µ′
Figure 1: Language semantics
non-interference) while avoiding multi-executions as much as our
optimized version of MF allows it. All proofs can be found in [23].
2 BACKGROUND ON SME AND MF
In this section, we discuss how on one hand, the underpinning
mechanism in MF reduces the number of executions compared
to SME, and on the other hand, may run more multi executions
than SME because of the security lattice based on principals. Our
goal here is partly pedagogical and partly to motivate and provide
intuition on the optimization proposed in Section 4.
Language and Semantics To investigate the foundation of mul-
tiple facets, we use a simple, deterministic while language. Its syntax
includes programs P , variables x , expressions e , and values v . We
use the symbol ⊕ for binary expression operators. A value is either
an integer value or a boolean value.
(programs) P ::= skip | x := e | if e then P1 else P2 |
while e do P | P1; P2
(expressions) e ::= v | x | e ⊕ e
Figure 1 presents standard big-step semantics of the language.
Memories µ map variables to values; we overload the notation of
memory and use µ(e) as the evaluation function for expression e in
memory µ, where µ(v) = v and µ(e1 ⊕ e2) = µ(e1) ⊕ µ(e2). We write
(P , µ) ⇓ µ ′ to mean that the evaluation of program P on memory µ
terminates with memory µ ′. We use µ[x 7→ v] for the memory µ ′
where µ ′(y) = µ(y) if y , x , and µ ′(y) = v if y = x .
MF may use fewer resources than SME SME [14] multi exe-
cutes programs, in a blackbox manner, as many times as security
levels in a lattice. Let’s define an SME memory as a function that
maps each variable to an array of values, one value per security
level. For the sake of simplicity, let’s consider first a security lattice
with only two elements H and L where H ̸⊑ L is the only disal-
lowed flow. Thus, an SME memory µˆ maps variables to an array
of 2 (possibly different) values: one corresponding to the H view
and one corresponding to the L view. Let’s denote such array of
values as ⟨v1 : v2⟩, where v1 is a private, H , view and v2 is a public,
L, view. Assume that H (µˆ) (resp. L(µˆ)) is a memory in the standard
semantics, obtained by projection of µˆ, mapping variables to single
values of the high view (resp. low view). Then, the SME monitoring
rule1 for such a language can be given by the relation ⇓SME−T IN I
as follows:
1We give here the termination insensitive version of SME.
SME-TINI
(P ,H (µˆ)) ⇓ µ1 (P ,L(µˆ)) ⇓ µ2
(P , µˆ) ⇓SME−T IN I µ1 ⊙ µ2
where ⊙ combines two normal memories into a SME memory in
such a way that H (µ1 ⊙ µ2) = µ1 and L(µ1 ⊙ µ2) = µ2. The SME
mechanism will blindly execute the program as many times as
possible views (or positions of the array) may exist.
Consider a program h := l where initial views for variables l
and h are given by: µˆ(h) = ⟨1 : 0⟩ and µˆ(l) = ⟨1 : 1⟩. In SME,
using the SME-TINI rule, the assignment will be executed twice:
once with H (µˆ) = [h 7→ 1, l 7→ 1] for the high view and once
with L(µˆ) = [h 7→ 0, l 7→ 1] for the low view. After execution, the
final SME memory will map h to ⟨1 : 1⟩. One way to reduce the
number of executions is to exploit the knowledge that the high
and the low view for variable l are equal, i.e., H (µˆ)(l) = L(µˆ)(l).
Since the semantics is deterministic, there is no need to execute the
program twice. We can use this knowledge by specialising SME at
the granularity of commands and include the following assignment
rule:
SME-optim
H (µˆ)(e) = L(µˆ)(e) (x := e,L(µˆ)) ⇓ µ
(x := e, µˆ) ⇓SME µˆ[x 7→ ⟨µ(x), µ(x)⟩]
Notice that this SME optimization requires to look inside the
shape of the program to evaluate if expression e of an assignment
satisfies the hypothesis.
In general, in order to reduce the number of executions using
the multi-execution technique of SME-TINI, it is sufficient to (i)
identify in an SME memory which values in the array of values are
equal and (ii) remember which values correspond to which views.
MF uses the multi-execution technique, implements (i) and (ii) and
hence, reduces the number of executions. MF encodes values in SME
memories (arrays with as many positions as lattice elements) as
ordered binary trees, where the order is given by the elements of the
lattice. For example, for a SME memory where µˆ(h) = ⟨1 : 0 : 0 : 0⟩
for a lattice of 4 elements with top element ⊤, an equivalent MF
memory encodes this array as ⟨⊤?1 : 0⟩ with the meaning that 1 is
the view for ⊤ and 0 for the rest. Every execution that depends on
that value, will multi execute twice instead of 4 times as in SME.
Moreover, MF further uses the view information provided by
the encoding in order to multi execute less in case of branching
commands. For example, for SME-TINI with SME memory µˆ(h) =
⟨1 : 0 : 0 : 0⟩ the program:
1: if h = 0 then
2: h := h + 1
executes 4 times (where the assignment at line 2 executes 3 times).
Using theMFmemory encoding µˆ(h) = ⟨⊤?1 : 0⟩, MF remembers
that at line 2 there is no possible observation for the view⊤ (because
for view ⊤ the value of h is 1 so it doesn’t take the then branch).
Hence, the assignmenth := h+1 only executes once with a memory
where h is 0 (the view of variable h corresponding to the 3 levels
which are not ⊤).
For a program h := l , where µˆ(l) is ⟨1 : 1⟩ in SME, MF keeps only
the value 1: a single value represents the fact that all views can
observe the same value. Thus the assignment h := l executes once
(and all future executions dependent on h will also be reduced).
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⊤ 
B1 B2 B3
⊥ 
Figure 2: Lattice ⟨LB,⊑⟩
Hence when encoding of an
SME memory can be reduced ef-
fectively, multi executions are re-
duced accordingly. As shown in
the following sections, preserva-
tion of MF memories encoding
through execution requires: to
represent arrays of values as trees
called faceted values and to eval-
uate expressions depending on faceted values. In particular, the
definition of the evaluation of expressions on faceted values de-
pends highly on the shape of expressions and their values according
to different views, and thus is contradictory to the blackbox prop-
erty of a monitor.
MFmay run more multi executions than SME Original MF
has one limitation with respect to SME: it was designed only for
a security lattice of principals: for n principals, such a lattice con-
tains 2n security levels. The following Ad Exchange platform [35]
example demonstrates that MF may be less efficient than SME in
practice, when the security lattice is not based on principals.
Example 2.1. AnAd Exchange platform needs to put an advertise-
ment on a publisher’s website. For that, it implements a Real-time
Bidding (RTB) system [36], where advertisers can bid for the space
on the publisher’s website to get their ad published. The system
receives as input all the bid offers from bidders and sorts them.
According to the RTB algorithm, the second best offer wins.
We present the lattice of 5 elements for this example in Fig. 2.
For simplicity, we consider only 3 bidders called B1, B2, and B3, an
Ad Exchange (⊤ level) which is able to see all the bids, and a public
view ⊥. Because MF is designed for a principal lattice, to encode 5
security levels, it uses 3 principals k1, k2, and k3, and create a lattice
of 8 = 23 levels, and thus has a potential to run some parts of the
program 8 times, while SME always executes the program 5 times.
We consider one test that naively checks the order of bid of-
fers and decides the winner. The encoding of the lattice is: ⊤ =
{k1,k2,k3}, Bi = {ki }, and ⊥ = ∅.
1: winner := 0;
2: test := (x1 ≤ x2) and (x2 ≤ x3);
3: if test then winner := 2 else skip
The bid values from bidders are x1 = ⟨k1 ? 10 : 0⟩, x2 = ⟨k2 ? 5 : 0⟩,
and x3 = ⟨k3 ? 7 : 0⟩. Thus, the resulting value of test at line 2 is
⟨k1 ? ⟨k2 ? ⟨k3 ?ff :ff⟩ : ⟨k3 ?ff :ff⟩⟩ : ⟨k2 ? ⟨k3 ?tt :ff⟩ : ⟨k3 ?tt :tt ⟩⟩⟩.
Therefore, the original MF executes the if instruction 8 times
with 3 useless executions for levels {k1,k2}, {k2,k3}, and {k1,k3}.
Moreover, because different views of a variable may contain the
same values, MF may execute the same statement several times. For
example, in the execution described above, original MF executes
the then branch 3 times, while it only needs to run once since the
threes executions for the then branch can be merged into one.
3 MF FOR ARBITRARY SECURITY LATTICE
We present an extension to the original Multiple Facets mecha-
nism [3] for an arbitrary security lattice ⟨L,⊑⟩, which we call Gen-
eralised Multiple Facets mechanism, or GMF. Similarly to Multiple
Facets, GMF operates over a faceted memory µˆ that maps variables
to simple values or faceted values. A faceted value is of the form
⟨l ?V1 :V2⟩ where l ∈ L is a security level, and Vi can be either
a faceted value or a simple value. The first facet V1 of ⟨l ?V1 :V2⟩
is called private, and visible to the observers at security level l or
higher levels in the lattice; the second facet V2 is called public, and
visible to security levels that are lower or incomparable to l . We
use V as a meta-variable for faceted values or simple values. Every
evaluation in GMF (see Fig. 6) is marked with a set of security levels
pc , for which the current computation is visible.
3.1 Expression evaluation
⊤ 
B1 B2 B3
⊥ 
H
M1 M2
L
Figure 3: Lattice ⟨L,⊑⟩
By µˆpc (e) we denote the evalu-
ation of expression e in faceted
memory µˆ with set of security lev-
els pc . The definition of µˆpc (e) is
presented in Fig. 4. For example,
consider the evaluation of x when
the faceted value x in memory µˆ is
⟨l ?V1 :V2⟩. To define which facet
is useful given a pc , we consider
the following cases:
• All the levels in pc are greater than or equal to l , denoted
l 4 pc (i.e. ∀l ′ ∈ pc . l ⊑ l ′): the evaluation can use the
private facet V1 because the public facet V2 is anyway not
useful for every level in this pc .
• All the levels in pc are lower than or incomparable to l ,
denoted l ̸4 pc (i.e. ∀l ′ ∈ pc . l ̸⊑ l ′): the evaluation can only
use the public facet V2 because V2 is a facet visible to any
view that is lower than or incomparable to l .
• Otherwise, we say that l and pc are incomparable and denote
it by l 9pc (i.e. ∃l ′, l ′′ ∈ pc . l ⊑ l ′∧ l ̸⊑ l ′′): we first evaluate
V1 with pc1 = {l ′ ∈ pc | l ⊑ l ′} – the set of all levels in pc
which are greater than or equal to l . Then, we evaluate V2
with pc2 = pc \ pc1 which is the set of all levels in pc which
are lower than or incomparable to l . Finally, we combine the
two results in a new faceted value.
To evaluate a variablex , we use a special unary operator ⊖pc (µˆ(x)),
which returns the value that is visible to all the levels in the pc .
Let’s consider the case of ⊖pc (⟨l ?V1 :V2⟩). Notice that, if pc and l
are incomparable, meaning that there are some levels in pc that are
higher than or equal to l and other levels in pc that are lower than
or incomparable to l , denoted by l 9pc , then the evaluation returns
the faceted value ⟨l ? ⊖pc1 (V1) : ⊖pc2 (V2)⟩. The form of the result
of µˆpc (e) is described in Lemma 3.1.
Lemma 3.1. If µˆpc (e) = ⟨l ?V1 :V2⟩, then l 9 pc .
Example 3.2 (Expression evaluation). Consider the lattice ⟨L,⊑
⟩ from Fig. 3, and the evaluation of x + y in µˆ, where µˆ(x) =
⟨M1 ? 10 : 0⟩ and µˆ(y) = ⟨M2 ? 5 : 0⟩.
Suppose that pc = {M1,H }. Since all the levels in pc are higher
than or equal toM1, the evaluation of x returns µˆpc (x) = 10. Since
pc andM2 are incomparable, the evaluation of y returns µˆpc (y) =
⟨M2 ? 5 : 0⟩. Next, the evaluation of 10 +pc ⟨M2 ? 5 : 0⟩ is split into
two: one uses a facet visible toM2 (and hence H ), and another one
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µˆpc (v) = v
µˆpc (x ) = ⊖pc (µˆ(x ))
µˆpc (e1 ⊕ e2) = µˆpc (e1) ⊕pc µˆpc (e2)
⊖pc (v) = v
⊖pc (⟨l ?V1 :V2 ⟩) =

⊖pc (V1) if l 4 pc
⊖pc (V2) if l ̸4 pc
⟨l ? ⊖pc1 (V1) : ⊖pc2 (V2)⟩ otherwise
v1 ⊕pc v2 = v1 ⊕ v2
v ⊕pc ⟨l ?V1 :V2 ⟩ =

v ⊕pc V1 if l 4 pc
v ⊕pc V2 if l ̸4 pc
⟨l ? (v ⊕pc1 V1) : (v ⊕pc2 V2)⟩ otherwise
⟨l ?V1 :V2 ⟩ ⊕pc V =

V1 ⊕pc V if l 4 pc
V2 ⊕pc V if l ̸4 pc
⟨l ? (V1 ⊕pc1 V ) : (V2 ⊕pc2 V )⟩ otherwise
where pc1 = {l ′ ∈ pc | l ⊑ l ′ } and pc2 = pc \ pc1.
Figure 4: Expression evaluation
µ ↑defΓ (x ) =
{
µ(x ) if Γ(x ) = glb(L),
⟨Γ(x ) ? µ(x ) : def (x )⟩ otherwise.
µˆ |Γ(x ) = l (µˆ)(x ) where l = Γ(x )
Figure 5: Functions for faceted and normal memories.
uses a public facet that will be visible toM1.
µˆpc (x + y) = µˆpc (x) +pc µˆpc (y)
= ⊖pc (⟨M1 ? 10 : 0⟩) +pc ⊖pc (⟨M2 ? 5 : 0⟩)
= 10 +pc ⟨M2 ? 5 : 0⟩ = ⟨M2 ? 10 +{H } 5 : 10 +{M1 } 0⟩
= ⟨M2 ? 15 : 10⟩
3.2 Semantics
We abuse the notation and use l as a projection function on simple
values, faceted values and faceted memories. For anyV , l(V ) returns
the value in V which is visible to users at level l . For any µˆ, l(µˆ)
returns the memory in µˆ which is visible to users at level l .
l(v) = v l(⟨l1 ?V1 :V2⟩) =
{
l(V1) if l1 ⊑ l ,
l(V2) otherwise.
l(µˆ)(x) = l(µˆ(x))
The projection function l is used in the definition of µˆ |Γ function
that converts a faceted memory to a simple memory (see Fig. 5).
The semantics of GMF is defined in Fig. 6 as a big-step evaluation
relation Γ ⊢ (P , µ) ⇓GMF µ ′, where program P is executed in a
memory µ and a security environment Γ that maps variables to
security levels in a given security lattice ⟨L,⊑⟩.
The main rule GMF first constructs a faceted memory from
the standard memory using the transformation µ ↑defΓ from Fig. 5,
where glb(L) is the greatest lower bound ofL. The resulting faceted
memory keeps original value of each variable x in a private facet,
GMF
(P, µ ↑defΓ ) ↓LG µˆ′
Γ ⊢ (P, µ) ⇓GMF µˆ′ |Γ
GSkip (skip, µˆ) ↓pcG µˆ
GAssign (x := e, µˆ) ↓pcG µˆ[x 7→ µˆpc (e)]
GSeq
(P1, µˆ) ↓pcG µˆ′ (P2, µˆ′) ↓
pc
G µˆ
′′
(P1; P2, µˆ) ↓pcG µˆ′′
GIf-C
µˆpc (e) = v (Pv , µˆ) ↓pcG µˆ′
(if e then Ptt else Pff, µˆ) ↓pcG µˆ′
GIf-S
µˆpc (e) = ⟨l ?V1 :V2 ⟩ pc1 = {l ′ ∈ pc | l ⊑ l ′ }
pc2 = pc \ pc1 µˆ1 = µˆ ⊎ (y 7→ V1) µˆ2 = µˆ ⊎ (y 7→ V2)
P ′ = if y then P1 else P2 (P ′, µˆ1) ↓pc1G µˆ′1 (P ′, µˆ2) ↓
pc2
G µˆ
′
2
(if e then P1 else P2, µˆ) ↓pcG (µˆ′1 \\y) ⊗l (µˆ′2 \\y)
GWhile
(if e then P ;while e do P else skip, µˆ) ↓pcG µˆ′
(while e do P, µˆ) ↓pcG µˆ′
where µˆ1 ⊗l µˆ2(x ) = [[⟨l ? µˆ1(x ) : µˆ2(x )⟩]]
Figure 6: Multiple facets for arbitrary security lattice
and adds default values (defined by def function) in a public facet.
In a special case when the level of x is the smallest level in a lattice,
we keep only a simple value µ(x) that is visible to all security levels.
We then evaluate the programwith the constructed faceted memory
and pc = L. The resulting faceted memory is transformed back to
a normal memory by using the projection function µˆ |Γ .
The semantics rules for skip, sequence andwhile loop are straight-
forward. The GAssign rule uses a faceted evaluation µˆpc (e) defined
in Section 3.1.
Before describing the semantics of if instruction, we first define
several auxiliary functions. Let dom(µˆ) be the domain of µˆ and y
be a fresh variable, i.e. y < dom(µˆ)). By µˆ ⊎ (y 7→ V ) we denote
a new memory µˆ ′, such that dom(µˆ ′) = dom(µˆ) ∪ {y}, µˆ ′(y) = V
and for all x ∈ dom(µˆ), µˆ ′(x) = µˆ(x). By µˆ \\y, we remove y from
the domain of µˆ, that is, µˆ \\y constructs a new memory µˆ ′, where
dom(µˆ ′) = dom(µˆ) \ {y} and for all x , y, µˆ(x) = µˆ ′(x).
Consider the evaluation of the if instruction if e then P1 else P2
with µˆ and pc . If e is evaluated to a constant value (tt or ff), then
only Ptt or Pff is evaluated (see rule GIf-C).
When e is evaluated to a faceted value ⟨l ?V1 :V2⟩, we construct a
new program if y then P1 else P2, wherey is a fresh variable. From
Lemma 3.1, we have that l 9 pc , and hence pc1 = {l ′ ∈ pc | l ⊑ l ′}
and pc2 = pc \ pc1 are non-empty. In this case, we run the new
program if y then P1 else P2 twice: once with the "higher view"
than l , i.e., with pc1 = {l ′ ∈ pc | l ⊑ l ′} and y set to a private facet
V1, and another time with "lower or incomparable view" than l , i.e.
with pc2 = pc \ pc1 and y set to a public facet V2. We then combine
the resulting memories using the ⊗l operator. The combination of
faceted memories is based on the fact that when pc is split into pc1
and pc2 in the GIf-S rule, all levels in pc1 is larger than or equal to
l , and all levels in pc2 is smaller than or incomparable to l .
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[[v]] = v
[[⟨l ?V1 :V2 ⟩]] =

[[V ]] if V1 = V2,
[[⟨l ?V11 :V22 ⟩]] elseif l1 ⊑ l, l ⊑ l2 ,V1 = ⟨l1 ?V11 :V12 ⟩,
V2 = ⟨l2 ?V21 :V22 ⟩,
[[⟨l ?V11 :V2 ⟩]] elseif l1 ⊑ l , V1 = ⟨l1 ?V11 :V12 ⟩,
[[⟨l ?V1 :V22 ⟩]] elseif l ⊑ l2, V2 = ⟨l2 ?V21 :V22 ⟩,
⟨l ? [[V1]] : [[V2]]⟩ otherwise.
Figure 7: Optimisation of a faceted value.
Notice that the form of a faceted value constructed by combining
values can be reduced. For example, a faceted value of the form
⟨H ? ⟨M1 ?V11 :V12⟩ :V2⟩ can be reduced to ⟨H ?V11 :V2⟩ because
M1 ⊑ H and the projection of the original value at any level is
eitherV11 orV2. We use the optimisation on the constructed faceted
values from Fig. 7.
Therefore, in the GIf-S rule after the evaluation of P ′ in two
contexts, we combine the resulting facetedmemories µˆ ′1\y and µˆ ′2\y
and apply an optimisation operator [[]] for each newly constructed
faceted value. The correctness of [[]] used to optimize faceted values
is proven in Lemma 3.3.
Lemma 3.3. For all l , all V , it follows that l(V ) = l([[V ]]).
Example 3.4 (Evaluation of if instruction). Consider the security
lattice ⟨L,⊑⟩ from Fig. 3 and the evaluation of the following pro-
gram P with pc = L and µˆ, where µˆ(x) = ⟨M1 ? ⟨H ?tt :ff⟩ :tt ⟩.
1: if x then z := 10 else z := 5
The evaluation follows theGIf-S rule sinceM19L.We construct
P ′ = if y1 then P1 else P2 and first evaluate P ′ with pc1 = {l ′ ∈
pc | M1 ⊑ l ′} = {M1,H } and µˆ1 = µˆ ⊎ (y 7→ ⟨H ?tt :ff⟩), and then
evaluate P ′ with pc2 = pc \ pc1 = {M2,L}, µˆ2 = µˆ ⊎ (y 7→ tt ).
Since pc1 = {H ,M1} and µˆpc (y) = ⟨H ?tt :ff⟩, the evaluation
of P ′ with pc1 and µˆ1 is split again to two evaluations: one with
P ′′ = if t then P1 else P2, pc11 = {H }, and µˆ11 = µˆ1 ⊎ (t 7→ tt );
and the other one with P ′′, pc12 = {M1}, and µˆ12 = µˆ1 ⊎ (t 7→ ff).
The evaluation of P ′′ with pc11 and with pc12 follow the GIf-C
rule and we get two faceted memories µˆ ′11 and µˆ
′
12, where µˆ
′
11(z) =
10 and µˆ ′12(z) = 5. Then, µˆ ′11 \\t and µˆ ′12 \\t are combined and we
get µˆ ′1, where µˆ
′
1(z) = ⟨H ? 10 : 5⟩.
The evaluation of P2 with pc2 follows the GIf-C rule and the
result is µˆ ′2, where µˆ
′
2(z) = 10. At this point, µˆ ′1 \\y1 and µˆ ′2 \\y1 are
combined and the result is µˆ ′, where µˆ ′(z) = ⟨M1 ? ⟨H ? 10 : 5⟩ : 10⟩.
Example 3.5 (Evaluation with the GMF rule). Consider the lattice
⟨L,⊑⟩ from Fig. 3 and program P from Example 3.4 with one more
instruction x := x1 > x2. Suppose that Γ(x1) = M1, Γ(x2) = H ,
Γ(z) = H , µ(x1) = 10, µ(x2) = 5, the default values for x1 and
x2 are respectively 100 and 20 2. Let µˆ = µ ↑defΓ . It follows that
µˆ(x1) = ⟨M1 ? 10 : 100⟩ and µˆ(x2) = ⟨H ? 5 : 20⟩.
1: x := x1 > x2
2: if x then z := 10 else z := 5
2The values and default values for x1 and x2 are chosen so that the value of x after
the evaluation of the assignment instruction is ⟨M1 ? ⟨H ?tt :ff⟩ :tt ⟩.
Following GMF rule, the program is evaluated with pc = L =
{H ,M1,M2,L}. For the assignment instruction, the value of x is
updated to µˆpc (x1 > x2) = ⟨M1 ? ⟨H ?tt :ff⟩ :tt ⟩. The rest of the
evaluation is described in Example 3.4, and the resultant faceted
memory is µˆ ′, where µˆ ′(z) = ⟨M1 ? ⟨H ? 10 : 5⟩ : 10⟩.
The memory after the application of rule GMF is µ ′ = µˆ ′ |Γ . Since
Γ(z) = H , the value of z is µ ′(z) = H (⟨M1 ? ⟨H ? 10 : 5⟩ : 10⟩) = 10.
3.3 Equivalence to SME-TINI and Security
Guarantee
SME-TINI. The semantics of SME-TINI, termination-insensitive
version of SME, for an arbitrary security lattice is presented below,
where ®µ is a vector that maps levels to normal memories; µ ⊎l Γ
constructs a memory where values of variables at levels that are not
visible to l are replaced by default values; ⊙Γ(®µ)(x) , ®µ[Γ(x)](x)
constructs a memory by combining all memories in ®µ; and def is a
function mapping variables to default values.
SME-TINI
∀l ∈ L : (P , µ ⊎l Γ) ⇓ ®µ[l]
Γ ⊢ (P , µ) ⇓SME−TINI ⊙Γ(®µ)
µ ⊎l Γ ,
{
def (x) if Γ(x) ̸⊑ l ,
µ(x) if Γ(x) ⊑ l .
We now prove that SME-TINI enforces termination-insensitive
noninterference (TINI). Two memories µ and µ ′ are equivalent at l
w.r.t. Γ (denoted by µ =Γl µ
′) iff for all x , Γ(x) ⊑ l =⇒ µ(x) = µ ′(x).
When Γ is clear from the context, µ =Γl µ
′ is written as µ =l µ ′.
Definition 3.6 (TINI). An enforcement mechanism A is termina-
tion insensitive non-interferent (TINI) if for all security environments
Γ, programs P , and memories µ1, and µ2, we have
µ1 =l µ2 ∧ Γ ⊢ (P , µ1) ⇓A µ ′1 ∧ Γ ⊢ (P , µ2) ⇓A µ ′2 =⇒ µ ′1 =l µ ′2.
Theorem 3.7. SME-TINI is TINI.
Equivalence to SME-TINI. To prove the equivalence between GMF
and SME-TINI, we formally define the semantic equivalence of two
mechanisms.
Definition 3.8. Two enforcement mechanisms A and B are equiv-
alent if for any Γ, P and µ, we have that Γ ⊢ (P , µ) ⇓A µ ′ iff
Γ ⊢ (P , µ) ⇓B µ ′.
We next establish the relation between the execution with GMF
semantics and the execution with the standard semantics.
Lemma 3.9. (P , µˆ) ↓pcG µˆ ′ iff (P , l(µˆ)) ⇓ l(µˆ ′) for all l ∈ pc .
Thanks to Lemma 3.9, we now prove the equivalence of GMF
and SME-TINI.
Theorem 3.10. GMF and SME-TINI are equivalent.
As a consequence, we have that GMF is TINI.
Remark 3.1. MF [3] is constructed for a set of principals. When
the set P of principals is fixed, we can use GMF to encode MF: we
construct the lattice ⟨2P, ⊆⟩, where each element is a set of principals;
we prove that GMF for ⟨2P, ⊆⟩ and MF for P are equivalent [23].
Track: Web Programming  WWW 2018, April 23-27, 2018, Lyon, France
735
4 OPTIMIZING GMF
In Section 3, we presented the semantics of Generalised Multiple
Facets (GMF) for arbitrary lattice and have proven it to be equivalent
to SME-TINI. However, GMF from Fig. 6 can be further optimised
and avoid repeating evaluations of the same commands. The fol-
lowing example demonstrates the sub-optimality of GMF.
Example 4.1 (GMF is not optimal). We consider the below pro-
gram from Example 2.1. The lattice is ⟨LB,⊑⟩ from Fig. 2.
1: winner := 0;
2: test := (x1 ≤ x2) and (x2 ≤ x3);
3: if test then winner := 2 else skip
Suppose that the bid offers of B1, B2, and B3 are respectively 10, 5,
and 7, and the default values forBi are 0. W.r.t. this setting, the initial
faceted memory is µˆ, where µˆ(x1) = ⟨B1 ? 10 : 0⟩, µˆ(x2) = ⟨B2 ? 5 : 0⟩,
and µˆ(x3) = ⟨B3 ? 7 : 0⟩. We consider the execution of the program
with GMF.
After line 2, test = ⟨B1 ? ⟨B2 ?ff :ff⟩ : ⟨B2 ?ff : ⟨B3 ?tt :tt ⟩⟩⟩. Fol-
lowing the semantics of GMF, the assignment instruction winner :=
2 is evaluated twice with pcB3 = {B3}, and pc⊥ = {⊥}; the skip
instruction is evaluated three times with pc⊤ = {⊤}, pcB1 = {B1},
and pcB2 = {B2}.
The main idea of our optimisation lays in reducing the number
of sub-evaluations and hence the number of faceted memory com-
binations. For Example 4.1, we propose a mechanism that merges
the evaluations corresponding to pcB3 and pc⊥ into one evaluation
withpc1 = {B3,⊥}. This simplification is possible since test denotes
the same value (i.e., tt ) under pcB3 and pc⊥. Similarly, our simplifi-
cation merges the evaluations corresponding topc⊤,pcB1, andpcB2,
where test denotes ff, into one evaluation with pc2 = {⊤,B1,B2},
and thus evaluates each branch of the if command only once.
In this section, we propose semantics of optimized GMF (OGMF)
that reduces the number of sub-evaluations, and hence is more
resource-friendly than GMF.
4.1 Semantics
The ideas behind the OGMF rule, and the rules for skip, assignment,
sequence, and while instructions are similar to the correspond-
ing ones of GMF. The functions µ ↑defΓ (x) and µˆ |Γ(x) are defined
in Fig. 5. We now explain the semantic rules for the conditional
instruction.
Consider evaluation of the program if e then P1 else P2 with pc
and memory µˆ, and µˆpc (e) = V . In order to evaluate each branch
of the conditional only once, we split the pc in two subsets: in the
first subset pc1 the visible value of V is true, and in the remaining
subset pc2, V is false. We now have three distinct cases.
If pc1 = pc , meaning that for all levels in pc , the visible value of
V is true, then P1 is evaluated (rule OIf-T). If pc2 = pc , then for all
levels in pc , the visible value of V is false, and only P2 is evaluated
(rule OIf-F). Finally, when pc is split in non-empty pc1 and pc2,
then both P1 and P2 are evaluated, and their results (µˆ ′1 and µˆ
′
2) are
combined by µˆ ′1 ⊕pc1,pc2 µˆ ′2 (rule OIf-S) to a new faceted memory.
The intuition behind this combination is that the projection of
µˆ ′1 ⊕pc1,pc2 µˆ ′2 at l ∈ pc1 is taken from the evaluation of P1 and its
projection at l ∈ pc2 is taken from the evaluation of P2.
OGMF
(P, µ ↑defΓ ) ↓LO µˆ′
Γ ⊢ (P, µ) ⇓OGMF µˆ′ |Γ
OAssign (x := e, µˆ) ↓pcO µˆ[x 7→ µˆpc (e)]
OSkip (skip, µˆ) ↓pcO µˆ
OSeq
(P1, µˆ) ↓pcO µˆ′ (P2, µˆ′) ↓
pc
O µˆ
′′
(P1; P2, µˆ) ↓pcO µˆ′′
OIf-T
µˆpc (e) = V
pc1 = {l ∈ pc |l (V ) = tt } pc1 = pc (P1, µˆ) ↓pcO µˆ′
(if e then P1 else P2, µˆ) ↓pcO µˆ′
OIf-F
µˆpc (e) = V pc1 = {l ∈ pc |l (V ) = tt }
pc2 = pc \ pc1 pc2 = pc (P2, µˆ) ↓pcO µˆ′
(if e then P1 else P2, µˆ) ↓pcO µˆ′
OIf-S
µˆpc (e) = V pc1 = {l ∈ pc |l (V ) = tt } pc2 = pc \ pc1
pc1 , ∅ pc2 , ∅ (P1, µˆ) ↓pc1O µˆ′1 (P2, µˆ) ↓
pc2
O µˆ
′
2
(if e then P1 else P2, µˆ) ↓pcO µˆ′1 ⊕pc1,pc2 µˆ′2
OWhile
P ′ = if e then P ;while e do P else skip (P ′, µˆ) ↓pcO µˆ′
(while e do P, µˆ) ↓pcO µˆ′
(µˆ′1 ⊕pc1,pc2 µˆ′2)(x ) =
{
[[µˆ′1(x )]] if µˆ′1(x ) = µˆ′2(x ),JF(µˆ′1(x ), µˆ′2(x ), pc1, pc2), pc1 ∪ pc2K otherwise.
Figure 8: Optimized multiple facets for arbitrary lattice
In the definition of combination of memories for OGMF (bottom
of Fig. 8), we distinguish two cases. If for some variable x , its value
in both faceted memories is the same, (µˆ ′1(x) = µˆ ′2(x)), then we do
not need to construct a new faceted value. Instead, we optimize the
current value using the optimisation operator from Fig. 7.
If the values of x in µˆ ′1(x) and µˆ ′2(x) are different, then we con-
struct a new faceted value V = F(V1,V2,pc1,pc2) and apply further
optimisation on the resulting value V using a new optimisation
operator that takes into account a faceted value and the current pc :JV ,pcK optimizes the form of V and is described in Fig. 9. We show
an example of such optimisation in Example 4.4.
To combine two faceted memories, we first construct a new
faceted value by using F(V1,V2,pc1,pc2):
F(V1,V2,pc1,pc2) = ⟨⟨List(pc1 ∪ pc2),V1,V2,pc1,pc2⟩⟩
where List(S) is a list of security levels from a set S , such that if l
appears before l ′ in List(S) then l ̸⊑ l ′. If the relation ⊑ in a given
security lattice is not a total order, we can transform it into a total
order ⊑T provided that ⊑ is a finite partial order. We can then view
List(S) as a list such that for any l and l ′ in this list, if l appears
before l ′, then l ′ ⊑T l .
The definition of F(V1,V2,pc1,pc2) uses the following operator
that creates a faceted value based on an ordered list of security
Track: Web Programming  WWW 2018, April 23-27, 2018, Lyon, France
736
levels L, two faceted values, pc1 and pc2:
⟨⟨L,V1,V2,pc1,pc2⟩⟩ =

l(V1) if L = l , l ∈ pc1,
l(V2) if L = l , l ∈ pc2,
⟨l ? l(V1) : ⟨⟨T ,V1,V2,pc1,pc2⟩⟩⟩
if L = l .T , T , [], l ∈ pc1,
⟨l ? l(V2) : ⟨⟨T ,V1,V2,pc1,pc2⟩⟩⟩
if L = l .T , T , [], l ∈ pc2.
Notice that the form of the faceted value created by F(V1,V2,pc1,pc2)
may be suboptimal.
Example 4.2 (Faceted value construction). Suppose that V1 =
2, V2 = 0, pc1 = {B3,⊥}, pc2 = {⊤,B1,B2}, List(pc1 ∪ pc2) is
⊤.B1.B2.B3.⊥, and the lattice ⟨LB,⊑⟩ is from Fig. 2.
Following the definition of combination of faceted memories, we
have F(2, 0,pc1,pc2) = ⟨⊤ ? 0 : ⟨B1 ? 0 : ⟨B2 ? 0 : ⟨B3 ? 2 : 2⟩⟩⟩⟩. This
value can be further reduced to ⟨B1 ? 0 : ⟨B2 ? 0 : 2⟩⟩.
We therefore define an optimisation function JV ,pcK that further
optimises the result V of a F() function. The optimisation uses the
observation that faceted value returned by F() has the form of
⟨l ?v :V ′⟩, where V ′ is either a simple value or a faceted value 3.
The function JV ,pcK is defined in Fig. 9. If V is of the form
⟨l ?v :v ′⟩, then the optimisation is straightforward. We now con-
sider the case whenV is of the form ⟨l ?v : ⟨l ′ ?v ′ :V ′⟩⟩. For demon-
stration, consider the lattice ⟨LB,⊑⟩ from Fig. 2.
If the faceted value V is of the form ⟨⊤ ?v : ⟨B1 ?v :V ′⟩⟩ (for-
mally, l ′ ⊑ l andv = v ′), then it can be reduced to J⟨B1 ?v :V ′⟩,pc ′K
(formally, J⟨l ′ ?v ′ :V ′⟩,pc ′K), where pc ′ = pc \ {⊤}.
If the faceted value V is of the form ⟨B1 ?v : ⟨B2 ?v :V ′⟩⟩, (l and
l ′ are incomparable and v = v ′), and moreover for all the levels in
the pc , for which either B1 or B2 is visible, it is guaranteed that they
observe the same value v (see the definition of cond(V ,pc) below),
then we distinguish the following two cases.
cond(V ,pc) , V = ⟨l ?v : ⟨l ′ ?v ′ :V ′⟩⟩ ∧
∀l1 ∈ pc : glb(l , l ′) ⊑ l1 =⇒ l1(V ) = v .
• If all levels in pc are greater than or equal to glb(l , l ′) (i.e.
glb(l , l ′) 4 pc), then V is reduced to v . For example, if pc =
{B1,B2,B3}, glb(B1,B2) = ⊥, then glb(B1,B2) 4 pc , and
thanks to the cond(V ,pc) we know that B1(V ) = B2(V ) =
B3(V ) = v , then we can reduce such faceted value to simply
v because value V ′ is not useful for such pc .
• If only some levels in pc are greater than or equal to glb(l , l ′)
(i.e. glb(l , l ′)9pc), thenV is reduced to ⟨glb(l , l ′) ?v :V ′′⟩ and
this value is reduced further recursively. Consider that we
add one more security level L to the lattice ⟨LB,⊑⟩ such that
L ⊑ ⊥. Ifpc = {B1,B2,L}, glb(B1,B2) = ⊥, then glb(B1,B2)9
pc because ⊥ ̸⊑ L. We then construct a set of security lev-
els S from pc , which are higher or equal than glb(l , l ′), and
therefore the view on V from all these levels is v (because
cond(V ,pc) holds). In our example, S = {B1,B2}, and we
construct a new faceted value V ′′ = ⟨⟨{L},V ′⟩⟩ = L(V ′). We
then define a new pc ′ = (pc \ S) ∪ {glb(l , l ′)} = {L,⊥},
and we need to keep glb(l , l ′) in pc ′ because we must ensure
3The function F() cannot return a simple value since it is called on non-empty pc1
and pc2 .
that all the levels present in the new faceted value are also
present in pc . Therefore, the reduced faceted value for our
example is J⟨⊥ ?v :L(V ′)⟩, {⊥,L}K.
Finally, if none of the above conditions hold then we recursively
reduce the facet ⟨l ′ ?v ′ :V ′⟩.
The correctness of µˆ1 ⊕pc1,pc2 µˆ2 in the OIf-S rule is proven in
Lemma 4.3.
Lemma 4.3. For all levels l , variables x , sets of security levels pc1
and pc2, and memories µˆ1 and µˆ2,
• if l ∈ pc1, then l(µˆ1 ⊕pc1,pc2 µˆ2)(x) = l(µˆ1)(x),
• if l ∈ pc2, then l(µˆ1 ⊕pc1,pc2 µˆ2)(x) = l(µˆ2)(x).
Example 4.4 (Optimisation of faceted value). Consider a faceted
value ⟨⊤ ? 0 : ⟨B1 ? 0 : ⟨B2 ? 0 : ⟨B3 ? 2 : 2⟩⟩⟩⟩ andpc = {⊤,B1,B2,B3,⊥}
from Example 4.2. We show how this value is optimised with our
optimisation function J, K:J⟨⊤ ? 0 : ⟨B1 ? 0 : ⟨B2 ? 0 : ⟨B3 ? 2 : 2⟩⟩⟩⟩, {⊤,B1,B2,B3,⊥}K =
= J⟨B1 ? 0 : ⟨B2 ? 0 : ⟨B3 ? 2 : 2⟩⟩⟩, {B1,B2,B3,⊥}K =
= ⟨B1 ? 0 : J⟨B2 ? 0 : ⟨B3 ? 2 : 2⟩⟩, {B2,B3,⊥}K⟩ =
= ⟨B1 ? 0 : ⟨B2 ? 0 : J⟨B3 ? 2 : 2⟩, {B3,⊥}K⟩⟩ = ⟨B1 ? 0 : ⟨B2 ? 0 : 2⟩⟩
Example 4.5 (OGMF is more resource-friendly than GMF). Con-
sider the program from Example 4.1. To show optimisation of
OGMF, we evaluate it with pc = {⊤,B1,B2,B3,⊥} and µˆ, where
µˆ(x1) = ⟨B1 ? 10 : 0⟩, µˆ(x2) = ⟨B2 ? 5 : 0⟩, and µˆ(x3) = ⟨B3 ? 7 : 0⟩.
After the execution of the instruction at line 2, the faceted memory
is µˆ ′ = µˆ[winner 7→ 0, test 7→ V ], where
V = ⟨B1 ? ⟨B2 ?ff :ff⟩ : ⟨B2 ?ff : ⟨B3 ?tt :tt ⟩⟩⟩.
We consider the execution of the if instruction. For levels pc1 =
{B3,⊥}, the evaluation of test is tt : B3(µˆpc (test)) = ⊥(µˆpc (test)) =
tt . Moreover, pc1 , pc , therefore, the rule OIf-S applies. The eval-
uation of the program is split to two: the first evaluation is with
P1 = winner := 2 and pc1 = {B3,⊥}; and the second evaluation
is with P2 = skip and pc2 = {⊤,B1,B2}. Each branch of the con-
ditional will be evaluated only once. The evaluation of P1 with
pc1 terminates with µˆ ′′1 (winner) = 2. The evaluation of P2 with
pc2 terminates with µˆ ′′2 (winner) = 0. These two faceted memories
are combined to µˆ ′′, where µˆ ′′(winner) = ⟨B1 ? 0 : ⟨B2 ? 0 : 2⟩⟩ (as
described in Examples 4.2 and 4.4).
In the example above, OGMF has only two sub-evaluations, while
GMF has five, moreover OGMF combines faceted memories once,
while GMF combines them four times. Therefore, OGMF is more
resource-friendly than GMF.
4.2 Equivalence to SME-TINI and Security
Guarantee
We first establish the relation between the standard semantics and
the semantics of OGMF.
Lemma 4.6. (P , µˆ) ↓pcO µˆ ′ iff (P , l(µˆ)) ⇓ l(µˆ ′) for all l ∈ pc .
We now can prove the semantic equivalence result for OGMF
and SME-TINI.
Theorem 4.7. OGMF and SME-TINI are equivalent.
As a consequence, OGMF and GMF are equivalent even though
OGMF is optimized. In addition, OGMF is TINI.
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J⟨l ?v :v ′⟩, pcK = {v if v = v ′⟨l ?v :v ′⟩ otherwise.
J⟨l ?v : ⟨l ′ ?v ′ :V ′⟩⟩, pcK =

J⟨l ′ ?v :V ′⟩, pc′K if l ′ ⊑ l , v = v ′, where pc′ = pc \ {l },
v if l ∥ l ′, v = v ′, cond(V , pc) and glb(l, l ′) 4 pc ,J⟨glb(l, l ′) ?v :V ′′⟩, pc′K if l ∥ l ′, v = v ′, cond(V , pc) and glb(l, l ′) 9 pc , where pc′ = (pc \ S ) ∪ {glb(l, l ′)},
S = {l1 ∈ pc | glb(l, l ′) ⊑ l1 }, and V ′′ = ⟨⟨List(pc \ S ), V ′⟩⟩,
⟨l ?v : J⟨l ′ ?v ′ :V ′⟩, pc′K⟩ otherwise, where pc′ = pc \ {l }.
⟨⟨L, V ⟩⟩ =
{
l (V ) if L = l ,
⟨l ? l (V ) : ⟨⟨T , V ⟩⟩⟩ if L = l .T , T , [].
Figure 9: Definition of JV ,pcK, and optimisation of a faceted value V with respect to the set of security levels pc.
5 A TERMINATION SENSITIVE VERSION OF
MULTIPLE FACETS
A termination sensitive model assumes that an attacker can observe
termination of evaluations. In [19], the model is explained further:
an attacker at level l can observe the termination of evaluations
at level l and lower. In the case of GMF and OGMF, an evalua-
tion marked with pc is an evaluation at l if l ∈ pc . Notice that an
evaluation is at more than one level whenever pc is not a singleton.
As illustrated by Example 5.1, GMF and OGMF do not prevent
the influence of private data at higher levels to the termination of
the evaluations at lower levels. In other words, GMF and OGMF do
not prevent leakage on termination channel [19].
Example 5.1. Suppose that L = {L,H }, where L ⊑ H . We look
at the evaluation of if x then (while tt do skip) else skip with
pc = L and µˆ(x) = ⟨H ?tt :ff⟩. When GMF or OGMF is used,
the evaluation is split into two: one is with pc1 = {H }, the other
one is with pc2 = {L}. The evaluation with pc2 converges, while
the evaluation with pc1 diverges since its executing program is
while tt do skip. Therefore, the evaluation of the whole program
with pc = {L,H } also diverges and hence, to an attacker at L, the
evaluation at L diverges. However, if the program is evaluated
with µˆ ′(x) = ⟨H ?ff :ff⟩, to the attacker at L, the evaluation at L
converges. Based on observations on those two evaluations, an
attacker at L can gain insight about the high facet of x . In other
words, GMF and OGMF do not prevent the influence of data at H
to the termination of the evaluation at L.
Therefore, we propose Termination SensitiveMultiple Facets (TSMF),
a version of MF that takes into account the termination sensitive
model. TSMF is a generalization of a version of MF presented in [8,
Appendix A]. The basic idea of TSMF is that when an if instruction
is evaluated, TSMF performs a bounded evaluation of the instruc-
tion by using OGMF. If the OGMF evaluation does not terminate
within the given time bound, then the instruction is evaluated in-
stead using SME semantics with a low-prio scheduler [14]. The
security guarantees offered by TSMF are the same as SME with
the same low-prio scheduler [19]. The semantics of TSMF and the
proofs about its security guarantees can be found in [23].
6 RELATEDWORK
SME. Devriese and Piessens introduce the idea of Secure Multi-
Execution [14]. Since then, many researchers have developed differ-
ent aspects of this approach. Close to our work, Kashyap et al. [19]
discuss how schedulers might affect security guarantees (i.e., TSNI
and TINI) based on the chosen scheduler and the lattice ordering.
They show several schedulers and classify them according to the
strength of security guarantees and according to fairness properties.
This work complement theirs by providing a similar analysis but
for an interplay of MF and SME semantics. SME [14] has many im-
plementations: as a library in Haskell [18], as an experimental web
browser based on Firefox [13], as a static program transformation
for both Python and JavaScript [4], and as an adaptation to reactive
systems [6]. In the work above, SME preserves the semantics of
secure programs up to interleaving of events. To remedy that, Za-
narini et al. [37] carefully leverage SME to design a precise monitor
which exactly preserves semantics of secure programs up to termi-
nation. Several other works [10, 26, 33] expand SME and introduce
declassification. In this work, we focus on semantics guarantees up
to interleaving of events—as in the SME original formulation.
MF. Austin and Flanagan introduce MF semantics [3]—a tech-
nique often referred as an optimization for SME. However, as shown
by Bielova and Rezk [7], they do not provide the same security guar-
antees (i.e., TINI vs. TSNI) and differ in their treatment of default
values. This work provides yet another look into a comparison
between both techniques to show their differences, while introduc-
ing novel value-based optimizations to MF. Another work by the
same authors [9] compare and contrast five dynamic techniques,
including MF and SME, to mainly reason about the preservation of
semantics of secure programs, a property known as transparency.
In this work, we show that GMF and OGMF enjoy the same trans-
parency guarantees as SME-TINI (Theorems 3.10 and 4.7).
Tools. Most information flow control tools provide TINI, e.g., Jif
[21], FlowCaml [25], Laminar [27], Paragon [11], and JSFlow [16].
Similarly, termination leaks are often ignored in security tools com-
ing from the operating system research community, e.g., Asbestos
[15], HiStar [38], and Flume [20]. A few exceptions to this trend
are the security libraries LIO [31] and MAC [28], which provide
TSNI for concurrent programs.
Decentralized label models. The decentralized label model (DLM),
allows one to express the interests of mutually-distrusting prin-
cipals without a central authority [22]. The set of labels forms a
pre-order where the order relationship does not require to know
all the points in the relationship to determine the result of com-
paring two labels—bearing in mind that there might be an infinite
number of labels due to the dynamic creation of principals at run-
time. In a similar spirit, DC-labels [32, 34] provides a decentralized
label format which allows one to express rich policies dictated
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by mutually-distrusting principals as propositional logic formulas
(without negation). In this work, we require to know all the points
in the chosen lattice in order to optimize MF as shown by OGMF.
Extending our techniques to DLM or DC-labels is an interesting
direction for future work.
7 CONCLUSION AND PERSPECTIVES
This work contributes to develop techniques to secure programs
using dynamic information flow—a promising approach to secure
existing JavaScript code. We specially focus on proposing a tech-
nique that achieves a smaller number of executions than MF (and
hence smaller memory footprint) without diminishing security
guarantees. We further extend our MF-based technique to work
with arbitrary finite lattices (GMF) based on the observation that
off-the-shelf lattices with principals are not always the most conve-
nient ones to use. Knowing all the points in the lattice allows for
further optimizations: spawning multi-executions could be done
on a value-based basis (OGMF) rather than on security levels—as in
original MF. Finally, we propose a hybrid approach which present
an interesting balance between the number of executions and secu-
rity guarantees: it behaves as OGMF as long as it can and switches
to SME when termination leaks could occur (TSMF). In other words,
TSMF prioritizes resource usage as long as there are no risks for
termination leaks. We expect that these insights will help inform
future development of multi-execution-based techniques. In fact,
an intriguing question is what it would take for our optimizations
(or future ones) to work on potentially infinite lattices like the DLM
or DC-labels—an interesting direction for future work.
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